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Abstract
This paper studies hours, employment, vacancies and unemployment at micro and macro levels. It
is built around a set of facts concerning the variability of unemployment and vacancies in the aggregate
and, at the establishment level, the distribution of net employment growth and the comovement of hours
and employment growth. A search model with frictions in hiring and ﬁring is used as a framework
to understand these observations. Notable features of this search model include non-convex costs of
posting vacancies, establishment level proﬁtability shocks and a contracting framework that determines
the response of hours and wages to shocks. The search friction creates an endogenous, cyclical adjustment
cost. We specify and estimate the parameters of the search model using simulated method of moments
to match establishment-level and aggregate observations. The estimated search model is able to capture
both the aggregate and establishment-level facts.
1 Motivation
This paper estimates a search model of the labor ﬂows exploiting both microeconomic and macroeconomic
data. Aggregate search models tend to focus on aggregate data, largely ignoring microeconomic evidence.
For these models, the search and matching process is the key labor market friction. In contrast, many
studies of labor adjustment costs emphasize microeconomic observations, but the aggregate implications of
these models remain unclear. For these studies, the friction is modeled through a rich speciﬁcation of costs
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1of adjusting employment. This paper attempts to break this dichotomy by estimating the parameters of a
search model based upon observations at the establishment-level as well as aggregate data.
A leading study of the aggregate implications of a search model is Shimer (2005). He argues that the
standard search model, based upon Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), fails to match certain key features of
aggregate data on worker ﬂows.1 In particular, Shimer reports that the model lacks a mechanism to magnify
shocks. The standard deviation of average labor productivity is about equal to the standard deviations of
unemployment and vacancies. But in the data, the standard deviations of both vacancies and unemployment
are about 10 times the standard deviation of average labor productivity.2 As discussed by Shimer and others,
the productivity impulses are apparently dampened by movements in the real wage, which in turn reduce
the incentive for creating more vacancies when productivity increases.
There are equally important, though less frequently cited, facts coming from observations at the estab-
lishment level. At the microeconomic level, employment adjustment is sporadic with periods of inactivity
in employment adjustment followed by relatively large adjustments in the number of workers.3 Aggregate
search models are routinely evaluated relative to macroeconomic ﬂows without reference to these observa-
tions of vacancy, employment and hours variations at the establishment level. This is unfortunate, both
because the aggregate models miss important microeconomic facts, and because capturing these features at
the micro level may enhance the ﬁt at the aggregate level.
One goal of this paper is to propose and estimate a model of labor adjustment at the microeconomic
level that is consistent with observations at both the aggregate and the establishment levels. To match
establishment-level observations, our model extends the search model in a couple of important directions.
First, it includes a theory of a producer with multiple jobs. Second, we allow for ﬁxed costs of posting va-
cancies at the establishment-level. Third, we estimate a process for proﬁtability shocks at the establishment-
level to match observations. These ingredients of the model allow us to match observed inactivity in em-
ployment ﬂows at the establishment-level.
For the aggregate variables, the greater variability of the establishment-level shocks can increase the vari-
ability of labor ﬂows. Accordingly, we include both the standard deviation of unemployment and vacancies
as moments to match. Further, in light of the challenge to Shimer’s conclusions in Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2006), we also include cyclical movements in average aggregate wages in our set of moments.
Another goal of this paper is to bridge the gap between the literatures on search models and labor
adjustment costs.4 One hypothesis is that the literature estimating labor adjustment costs is uncovering the
1In an earlier paper, Cole and Rogerson (1999) looked at the implications of the Mortensen and Pissarides matching model
relative to facts about aggregate job creation and job destruction. They report some success matching aggregate job ﬂows.
2Not surprisingly, this has sparked a considerable discussion concerning these results per se as well as alternatives to the
standard model meant to better confront these facts. See Yashiv (2006) for a survey of this ongoing research.
3See the discussion and references in Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004) on job ﬂows. Recent evidence on worker ﬂows
draws upon Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b).
4See, for example, the discussion in Nickell (1986) and Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) of the sources of these frictions in labor
adjustment and empirical speciﬁcations to capture them.
2implications of search frictions. While the search friction can be viewed as just another form of adjustment
costs at the establishment level, it is diﬀerent from other frictions because it is endogenous. That is, the cost
of ﬁlling vacancies will generally depend on the tightness of labor markets, which is an equilibrium outcome.
The search model we estimate allows for both search costs and ﬁring costs. Both types of adjustment
costs are quite successful in matching both establishment level and aggregate movements. In fact, with the
moments we have chosen, it is not possible to conclude that the model with hiring costs is superior to one
with ﬁring costs.
The estimated model does not suﬀer from the magniﬁcation puzzle highlighted by Shimer (2005). This is
partly due to the role of the idiosyncratic shocks at the establishment-level which, given the non-convexities
in the model, are not smoothed by aggregation. Further, the model matches moments on procyclical average
wages so that aggregate shocks induce producers to create vacancies. Finally, in our model average labor
productivity is endogenous, reﬂecting both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks along with labor market
frictions. So, part of the resolution of the magniﬁcation puzzle comes from the model’s implications for the
behavior of average labor productivity.
2 Facts
We present empirical evidence on key moments from both aggregate and establishment-level data which form
the basis of our empirical analysis. First, section 2.1 provides facts on vacancies, unemployment, and produc-
tivity drawn heavily from Shimer (2005). The ﬁndings from the latter paper have spawned substantial debate
in the literature (see, e.g., Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006)) as to whether standard search and matching
models can capture the observed volatility and dynamics of vacancy and unemployment. Second, section 2.2
provides facts on hours and employment dynamics at the aggregate and establishment-level. A key theme of
our analysis is to exploit the diﬀerences in moments at the aggregate and establishment-level. Third, section
2.3 continues with this theme by presenting facts about the establishment-level employment growth rate
distribution and the relationship between this distribution and hours and separations at the establishment-
level. Fourth, section 2.4 presents empirical evidence on the cyclicality of real wages. The evidence presented
in this section is mostly drawn from the recent literature which we supplement from various databases from
the U.S. statistical agencies. Together, this evidence provides a rich empirical characterization of U.S. labor
markets and are used to estimate the parameters of our structural search model.
2.1 Unemployment, Vacancy and Productivity Dynamics
Table 1 summarizes the main ﬁndings on unemployment, vacancies and labor productivity, as in Shimer
(2005).5 The ﬁrst part of the table reports U.S. data on unemployment u, vacancies v and average labor
5This table was produced by Murat Tasci and appears in Tasci (2006).
3productivity, denoted p.6
There are three features of the data which deserve emphasis:
• the standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies are both about 10 times the standard deviation
of average labor productivity,
• the data exhibit the Beveridge curve: the correlation between unemployment and vacancies is strongly
negative,
• both unemployment and vacancies are highly serially correlated.
U.S. DATA (Quarterly, 1951Q1-2003Q4)
u v v/u p
Std 0.19 0.20 0.38 0.02
Auto 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.89
Cross Correlations




u v v/u p
Std 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
Auto 0.85 0.74 0.81 0.81
Cross Correlations
u −0.87 −0.94 −0.94
v 0.99 0.99
v/u 0.99
For the data moments, the level of unemployment, u, is from the CPS, the level of vacancies, v, is from the Conference Board
and average labor productivity, p, is real output per person. These variables are seasonally adjusted and are log deviations
from an HP trend.
Table 1: Unemployment and Vacancies
The second part of the table reports moments from a “Standard Search Model” and come from Tasci
6These observations are quarterly, seasonally adjusted and detrended using a HP ﬁlter. Here unemployment is a level not a
rate. See the discussion in Shimer (2005) for more data details.
4(2006).7 The structure of the model generating these moments is summarized in section 3.5.8
Comparing the two panels of Table 1, it is clear that the standard search model, as parameterized in
Shimer (2005), is unable to create the volatility in unemployment and vacancies observed in the data. We
refer to this as the ampliﬁcation puzzle. Interestingly, the model is able to capture the negative correlation
between vacancies and unemployment, the Beveridge curve.
In what follows, we use key moments on the relationship between vacancies and unemployment consistent
with the ﬁndings in Table 1. In our analysis we focus on vacancy dynamics using the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data as opposed to the vacancy data from the Help Wanted Index used by Shimer
(2005). As many have noted (including Shimer (2005)), the Beveridge curve and volatility of vacancies and
unemployment using the JOLTS data (and JOLTS sample period) are similar to that as reported in Table
1.9 We use the JOLTS data on vacancies since the latter data are monthly and as will be seen below we
use the monthly establishment-level distribution of employment growth rates from JOLTS in our analysis.
Given our focus on adjustment costs and search and matching frictions, treating a period as one month in
our model is more justiﬁable. The key moments we use are the standard deviation of the unemployment
rate, the standard deviation of vacancy rate and the correlation of unemployment and vacancies. From the
JOLTS data and sample period, these three statistics are 0.086, 0.116 and -0.954, respectively.
2.2 Aggregate and Establishment-Level Hours and Employment Dynamics
Evidence about aggregate and establishment-level hours and employment dynamics is reported in Table 2.
The data set underlying the moments reported in Table 2 contains observations of production workers in each
quarter and their total hours worked during the quarter from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD)
for the period 1972-80.10 This information allows us to compute average hours per worker on a quarterly
basis. The LRD only has information on hours per worker on a quarterly basis for this sample period.
We use moments based on the growth (log ﬁrst diﬀerence) of hours per worker and employment at the
7The results are very similar to those reported in Shimer (2005).
8The model follows that presented in Shimer (2005) and Tasci (2006). Cole and Rogerson (1999) contains a very clear
summary of model essentials.
9The volatility of vacancies and unemployment is smaller from JOLTS. This may reﬂect the sample period as well as the
data used – many have noted the vacancy volatility from the Conference Board HWI series may be implausibly high – see, e.g.,
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006a).
10The data are for manufacturing plants and are quarterly from 1972-80 and thus do not overlap with the establishment-level
data used from JOLTS – see Table 3 below. The data set and its connections to data used in other establishment-level studies
is discussed in detail in Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004). In the quantitative analysis that follows, we are careful to
distinguish between empirical moments from quarterly vs. monthly observations and in turn to take in account time aggregation
issues. An open question is the representativeness of the moments for the manufacturing sector for the entire economy. We
do know that the variance of establishment-level growth rates for the U.S. manufacturing sector is somewhat lower than, but
roughly comparable to, that for the whole U.S. economy. As discussed in Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004) the moments
based upon aggregate data in Table 2 are robust to using BLS quarterly data on U.S. manufacturing hours and employment
from 1972-2003. Thus, while the evidence in Table 2 is conﬁned to manufacturing only it appears that key moments are robust
to a longer time period than covered by the LRD.
5establishment level in Table 2 to focus on the patterns of adjustment of the labor input rather than the
size distribution of the establishments in our sample. In computing these moments at the establishment-
level, year and seasonal eﬀects have been removed. Thus these moments characterize the aspects of the
cross-sectional distribution of employment and hours growth.11
There are three important observations about establishment-level adjustment worth emphasizing as ob-
served in the moments reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.
• the standard deviations of hours growth and employment growth are about the same,
• hours growth and employment growth are negatively correlated
• hours growth in one period is positively correlated with employment growth in the next.
These facts, particularly the negative correlation in employment and hours growth, were important in dis-
tinguishing models of labor frictions in Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004) and Caballero, Engel, and
Haltiwanger (1997) and play a similar role in this study of search frictions.
The second column of Table 2 is based on aggregating the establishment-level data used in the ﬁrst
column and considering the aggregate time-series variation alone. For the aggregate data,
• the correlation of hours and employment growth is positive,
• the standard deviation of employment growth is almost twice that of hours growth.
• hours growth tends to lead employment growth 12
The sharp contrast between the establishment-level and aggregate hours and employment dynamics is a
key theme in our analysis. One of the challenges for a model of labor adjustment is to explain the diﬀerent
patterns of the cross-sectional and time-series moments in Table 2.
2.3 Establishment-Level Employment Growth, Hires and Separations
A new establishment-level survey that enables measuring vacancies, hires, separations and employment
growth is the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which samples about 16,000 establishments
per month. Respondents report hires and separations during the month, employment in the pay period
covering the 12th of the month, and job openings at month’s end. They also report quits, layoﬀs and
discharges, and other separations (e.g., retirements). Recent analysis of the establishment-level data from
JOLTS is reported in Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b) and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger
(2006a). Drawing from Figures 6 and 7 of Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b), we provide summary
information about the patterns of worker and job ﬂows at the establishment level which is summarized in
11If we compute these moments on a quarterly basis for each of the quarters in our sample, the variation over time is relatively
small. Thus we interpret these as cross-sectional moments.






∗ Seasonal and Aggregate Eﬀects removed from establishment-level moments.
Seasonal Eﬀects removed from aggregate-level moments
Table 2: Hours and Employment Adjustment: Basic Facts from the LRD∗
Table 3.13 Net employment growth at the establishment-level is characterized by ﬁve bins as listed in the
ﬁrst column. The second column shows the share of employment growth in each of these ﬁve bins. The
remaining columns decompose the employment growth into hires and separations. The column labeled “net”
is the average employment growth within each of the bins.
Net Emp. Growth Share of Emp. Hires Sep. net
<-0.10 0.040 0.025 0.291 -0.266
-0.10 to -0.025 0.083 0.023 0.075 -0.052
-.025 to 0.025 0.745 0.015 0.015 0.000
0.025 to 0.10 0.092 0.079 0.028 0.051
>0.10 0.040 0.296 0.041 0.266
Table 3: Monthly Net Employment Growth Rate Distribution
These moments are size-weighted by employment share. So, for example, about 4.0% of workers were
employed in an establishment which had net employment adjustment in excess of 10% in an average month.
From the ﬁrst three columns of the table and additional examination of the data, a couple of facts stand
out:
• there is a signiﬁcant amount of relatively small net employment adjustment: about 74% of the size-
weighted observations entail net employment adjustment between −2.5% and 2.5% in an average
13We thank these authors for the summary of the data points underlying these ﬁgures. Faberman (2005) provides a detailed
discussion of the data set. See the detailed discussion in Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b) regarding the measurement
methods to insure the timing of net growth and hires and separations line up.
7month,
• there are signiﬁcant bursts of job creation and destruction: many establishments (8%) either contract
or expand employment by more than 10% in a month.
For each employment growth bin, Table 3 presents the average rates of hires and separations.14 As
illustrated in the table, establishments expanding employment by more than 10% do so through high hiring
rates, though interestingly, separation rates are also higher for this group.
There is also substantial inaction in employment adjustment. About 32% of the size-weighted observations
entail zero adjustment of net employment. The inaction rate on an establishment basis rises to 78%.15 We
also note that about 45% of the size-weighted observations entail zero vacancies.16
Our empirical analysis attempts to match the moments reported in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 3. We
also discuss the implications of our model for the observed patterns of hires and separations.
A particularly challenging aspect of matching the patterns of net employment growth is the presence
of inaction along with a substantial fraction of observations with relatively small adjustment. With zero
adjustment in 32% of the size-weighted observations, the remainder of the 74.5% of the observations with
employment growth between -2.5% and +2.5% are relatively small adjustments. As we shall see in discussions
of our models, the inaction is consistent with a model in which non-convexities are an important element of
adjustment costs. But this model has diﬃculty explaining the small adjustments.
We interpret some of the very small adjustments as a form of noise reﬂecting factors outside of our
model (and outside the scope of most of the the search and matching literature). For example, in JOLTS an
establishment is not supposed to report vacancy postings (job openings) that arise from workers returning
from a temporary leave of absence or a hire of a worker onto the payroll who was previously a contract or
temporary employee. The point is that such changes in employment status of workers would show up in the
measured net employment growth distribution in Table 3 but would not show up in vacancies. Our model
like much of the search and matching literature focuses on the costs associated with posting vacancies and
making hires – if some of the measured employment changes don’t involve such costs then they are outside
the scope of our model and much of the literature.17
In the analysis that follows we attempt to match the fraction of employment at establishments with
very small adjustments but do not distinguish between zero adjustment and very small adjustments. This
choice of moments reﬂects our concern with the measurement issues noted above as well as the fact that
observations of large adjustments in employment, along with the correlation of hours and employment, are
informative moments with respect to non-convexities in the labor adjustment process.
14These are all expressed in rates. Separations equals layoﬀs plus quits plus other separations – the latter are not reported
but are small.
15This statistic is from Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b).
16This statistic is from Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006a).
17Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006a) present evidence that as many as a third of all hires occur without posted
vacancies.
82.4 The Cyclicality of Real Wages
It is well known that quantifying empirically the cyclicality of real wages (see, e.g., Abraham and Haltiwanger
(1995)) is a challenge. Empirical patterns are sensitive to time period, the alternative real wage series that
can be constructed from aggregate and micro level data, and concerns about cyclical composition bias (Bils
(1987) and Barsky, Solon, and Parker (1994)). In addition, the measurement-concept gap between the
measurement of real wages in the data relative to the relevant shadow real wage is another challenge.
These measurement and conceptual issues have not been resolved but it is apparent from the recent search
and matching literature that accounting for the cyclicality of real wages is essential. Much of the debate
between Shimer (2005), Hall (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) about the ability of standard search
and matching models to be able to account for the volatility and dynamics of unemployment and vacancies
centers on what fraction of the driving processes are absorbed by variations in wages or the labor input.
In our setting, these issues are also relevant and in our analysis we follow the recent literature by using
moments on the cyclicality of real wages. Since the measurement and conceptual issues regarding real wage
cyclicality have not been resolved, we follow the basic approach of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) and
explore the sensitivity of our results by considering a range of cyclical elasticities of real wages.
Three alternative measures of aggregate real wages produced by the BLS have been used in the literature
(see, e.g., Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) and for more recent evidence see Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2006)). The most commonly used is average hourly earnings (AHE) for nonsupervisory workers from the
BLS establishment surveys. An alternative measure that accounts for non-wage compensation and holds
the industry and occupation composition of the workforce constant over the cycle is the Employment Cost
index (ECI). The more recent literature (see, e.g., Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) and Rudanko (2006))
focuses on a measure of real wages from the BLS productivity statistics program that is constructed in a
manner consistent with the ouput per person and hour data produced and released by the BLS. That is, BLS
constructs a measure of hourly compensation based upon the quarterly income from the NIPA attributable
to labor.18 We have examined the real wage cyclicality of all three series (using the CPI to convert nominal
wages to real) and while we ﬁnd they are positively correlated (especially the AHE and ECI series), the
series with greater cyclical volatility is the BLS real hourly compensation series (RHC).19
In the recent literature (i.e., Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) and Rudanko (2006)), the elasticity of real
18BLS constructs a measure of quarterly output per person and hour data using quarterly measures of output from the
National Income and Product accounts (NIPA) and its own constructed measures of employed persons and hours. For purposes
of being able to construct a measure of unit labor costs, BLS constructs a measure of hourly compensation based upon the
quarterly income from the NIPA attributable to labor. In releasing its output per hour and unit labor cost series, BLS also
releases the underlying hourly compensation data (in both nominal and real terms). It is this latter series that has been used
in the recent literature – see Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) and Rudanko (2006).
19In terms of coverage and deﬁnition of compensation, the ECI and RHC are more similar to each other than the AHE.
However, we ﬁnd a closer correspondence between the ECI and the AHE. See http://www.bls.gov/lpc/faqs.htm#Q13 for
discussion of the possible sources of diﬀerences between the ECI and RHC. We also note that for both the AHE and RHC, real
wage cyclicality is greater if the 1960s and 1970s are included in the sample.
9wages (measured as the HP-detrended real hourly compensation series) with respect to labor productivity
(also measured as the HP-detrended series) is about 0.45. Moreover, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) reports
that in using PSID data and controlling for composition bias that they obtain an elasticity of real wages
at the micro level that is only slightly higher and about 0.47.20 To explore sensitivity of their results to
this elasticity, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) use the 95 percent conﬁdence interval of their real wage
elasticities. We have obtained the same data and replicate this elasticity of 0.45 with a 95 percent conﬁdence
interval of 0.33 to 0.57.21
In our analysis, we use the point estimate of 0.45 along with the conﬁdence interval range to explore
sensitivity. In considering this range, it is useful to note that this elasticity is on the high end of the patterns
observed in the data. We ﬁnd that the elasticity of the AHE real wage series with respect to productivity
growth is 0.26 with a 95 percent conﬁdence interval of 0.21 to 0.32.
We also ﬁnd that the RHC real wage series yields an elasticity with respect to employment growth of
0.16 with a 95 percent conﬁdence interval of 0.05 to 0.27 while the AHE real wage series yields an equivalent
elasticity of 0.20 with a 95 percent conﬁdence interval of 0.16 to 0.25. These patterns show that the RHC
real wage series tracks labor productivity more closely than AHE but both track cyclical employment about
the same.22
3 Model
This section speciﬁes the model. We ﬁrst provide an overview and then discuss the components in detail.
3.1 Model Overview
There are two types of agents in the model: producers and workers. Producers operate production sites
which use labor as an input.23 The labor input is total hours and thus combines the number of employees
and hours worked per employee. There are both aggregate and producer-speciﬁc shocks which create revenue
from the labor input.
20This relatively modest impact of composition bias is roughly consistent with the literature. Barsky, Solon, and Parker
(1994) ﬁnd the most pronounced composition bias and their elasticity of real wages with respect to unemployment changes from
0.006 to 0.116 due to composition bias.
21We use a shorter sample period, 1964-2006 than Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) (who uses the 1951-06 period) but obtain
the same elasticity. We use the shorter time period since this permits us to explore sensitivity with other real wage and cyclical
indicators (e.g., AHE).
22There is an open question whether the correlation between the RHC real wage series and average labor productivity is
spuriously high since measurement error in quarterly GDP will yield a positive correlation between RHC and average labor
productivity.
23In this discussion, producers operate a production site and not a ﬁrm. This is consistent with our establishment level obser-
vations and assumes that ﬁrms with multiple establishments operate them independently, at least with respect to employment
decisions.
10Workers and producers are brought together through a search process. A worker who is matched with a
producer has hours and compensation speciﬁed through a state-contingent contract. The worker may lose
this job in a subsequent period, thus returning to a state of unemployment. Reﬂecting the search friction,
workers without a job are assumed to ﬁnd a new job with some probability each period. This probability is
exogenous to the worker but is determined in equilibrium.
Producers have, at a point in time, a set of workers with whom they have a contract. In the short-run, the
producer responds to variations in a proﬁtability shock, reﬂecting both productivity and demand, through
changes in hours worked per employee. The contract determines the response of hours and compensation to
the shock.
Producers also can create vacancies and hence change the number of employees. The process of creating
and ﬁlling vacancies entails adjustment costs. We allow for both ﬁxed and variable costs of posting vacancies.
The presence of these ﬁxed costs distinguishes our model from the existing search literature and deﬁnes the
boundaries of a producer. Empirically, these ﬁxed costs are important for matching observed inaction in the
adjustment of the number of workers.
With this structure in mind, we reconsider the motivation for this exercise. The assumption that produc-
ers have a ﬁxed cost of posting vacancies generates some inaction in vacancies and employment adjustment.
This is consistent with establishment-level evidence. Further, the observed negative correlation between
hours worked and the number of workers could reﬂect the inaction in posting vacancies. A producer not
hiring in the current period responds to higher demand for its product by increasing the hours of its workers.
But once the producer decides to post vacancies and hires more workers, average hours worked drops.
From the perspective of matching moments on worker, job and unemployment ﬂows as well as vacancies,
there are a couple of points to raise. First, the driving process for the model is establishment-speciﬁc
proﬁtability. Various studies ﬁnd that productivity at the establishment level is considerably more variable
than in the aggregate. Thus, perhaps one resolution of the magniﬁcation problem highlighted in Shimer
(2005) is through the presence of volatile establishment-level shocks. The key is that, perhaps, these shocks
will create job and worker ﬂows without increasing the measured variability of average labor productivity.24
As in Yashiv (2000), the model we consider has costs of adjusting the number of vacancies.25 As well
as creating inaction in vacancy creation and hiring, the non-convexity in adjustment may also increase the
volatility of job and worker ﬂows.
3.2 Workers
In general, workers are in one of two states, employed or unemployed. If unemployed, the workers enjoy leisure
time and/or the fruits of home production, U(b(a)), which is allowed to depend on the level of aggregate
24The mapping from a distribution of establishment-speciﬁc proﬁtability shocks to an aggregate measure of average labor
productivity is likely to entail some smoothing through aggregation and by worker ﬂows across producers.
25Yashiv (2000) does not allow for non-convexity in the costs of vacancy creation and thus can estimate parameters from
Euler equations. His speciﬁcation does include diﬀerentiable non-linearities in the adjustment costs.
11productivity, a. With a positive probability, unemployment workers become employed in the subsequent
period. Formally, the value of unemployment for a worker is given by the following:
V u(¯ u, ¯ v,a) = U(b(a)) + βE[f(¯ u, ¯ v)V e + (1 − f(¯ u, ¯ v))V u] (1)
where f(¯ u, ¯ v) is the job ﬁnding rate which depends on the unemployment rate and the aggregate vacancy rate,
¯ u and ¯ v respectively. Here there is an expectations operator associated with the future value of employment,
V e and V u. The future value of employment is random since jobs with diﬀerent producers may lead to
diﬀerent levels of compensation and hours. The randomness of the future value of unemployment reﬂects
uncertainty in the future value of leisure and in the job ﬁnding rate.
Employed workers have a contract for the current period which governs their state-contingent compen-
sation and hours worked. Workers do not save in equilibrium so that compensation and consumption are
identical. We specify utility of consumption (c) and hours worked as U(ω − g(h)).26 Here U(·) is strictly
increasing and strictly concave and g(·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex.27
The value of being employed is given by
V e = E{U(ω − g(h)) + β[(1 − S)V e + SV u]} (2)
where S is the separation (quits plus ﬁres) rate.28 The ﬁrst term is the expected utility given a contract,
described below, with a producer. In the following period there is a probability, given by S, of losing their
jobs and becoming unemployed. Workers discount at rate β. As noted earlier, both V e and V u are state
contingent.
The expectation in (2) is taken with respect to idiosyncratic shocks at the producer with whom the
worker is employed as well as future state variables. As discussed below, we give all of the bargaining power
to producers. Thus the exact details of what information workers have is, in equilibrium, immaterial. The
assumption of giving producers all of the bargaining power immensely simpliﬁes the analysis since workers
do not care which producer they work for. Otherwise, the diﬀerent producers would oﬀer diﬀerent terms
and have diﬀerent retention probabilities, and workers would have to keep track of the entire distribution of
producers.
3.3 Producers
Producers have access to a technology which creates output from labor input. The revenue function is given
by
26The model can accommodate more general utility functions but this speciﬁcation is particularly tractable.
27While worker’s do face uncertainty in (net) consumption, ω − g(h), workers all have the same level of net utility ex post.
Thus workers have no incentive to trade state contingent consumption. Further, there is no store of value in the model and
thus compensation and consumption are the same.
28This value may be producer speciﬁc but is ignored in the notation.
12aε(eh)α (3)
where a is the aggregate (proﬁtability) shock, ε is the producer-speciﬁc shock and total labor input is the
product of the number of workers, e, and hours per worker, h. We allow for curvature in the revenue function,
parameterized by α, which may capture diminishing returns to scale due to ﬁxed factors of production
excluded from (3).
We assume two stages in the producer’s problem. First, given the aggregate state, the producer contracts
with its workers. Second, ex post, the producer-speciﬁc shock is realized, and state-contingent hours are
determined given the contract.
3.3.1 Setting a Contract
A contract is δ = (ω(s),h(s)) for all s, where s = (a,ε,e,θ) is the establishment’s state. This state vector
includes θ ≡ ¯ v
¯ u which measures the tightness of labor markets. This aggregate variable, as explained in more
detail below, summarizes the state of the labor market and is needed for the producer to predict the ease of
hiring workers.
In the state contingent contract, ω(s) is compensation and h(s) is hours worked. The contract allows
compensation and hours to be fully state contingent. In terms of timing, the contract is determined given
(a,e) but prior to the determination of ε. This timing is consistent with the literature on risk sharing through
labor contracts and is important for matching moments on relative employment and hours variability. All
workers with a given producer get the same contract since they are identical and have the same outside
option of unemployment.
For the contracting process, assume producers make a take-it-or- leave-it oﬀer to workers. This implies
that employed workers get no surplus: V e = V u. Therefore the value of employment in equilibrium is
independent of the producer with whom the worker has a job.
Thus the producer selects the contract to solve
π(a,e) = maxδEε[aε(eh(s))α − eω(s)] (4)
where the expectation is over the idiosyncratic component of proﬁtability. The constraint is that the expected
utility from the contract not be less than the outside option of unemployment, V u:
V e(a) = EεU(ω(s) − g(h(s))) + βEa0|a[(1 − S)V e(a0) + SV u(a0)] ≥ V u(a) (5)
where V e is the value of being employed next period and V u is the value of being unemployed next period.29
29These values depend on aggregate productivity through b(a) but do not depend on labor market tightness since V e(a) =
V u(a) for all a.
13Assuming the worker’s participation constraint binds, V e = V u for all a, EεU(ω(s)−g(h(s))) = U(b(a))
for all s. Given the risk aversion of the workers, optimal risk sharing implies that marginal utility is
independent of the realized value of ε. Thus compensation and hours will satisfy the condition
U(ω(s) − g(h(s))) = U(b(a)) (6)
for all s.
Interestingly, producer heterogeneity is present in compensation levels, and hours reﬂect producer-speciﬁc
state variables and shocks. So there will be a non-degenerate cross-sectional distribution of (ω,h) but a
degenerate cross-sectional distribution of utility levels given the aggregate state.
Variations in the aggregate state, acting through b(a), will inﬂuence the terms of the contract. In this
way, the model produces movements in the aggregate wage without the complexity of allowing the workers
to have bargaining power.30 This added feature is important for matching observations on aggregate wage
movements and for tempering the response of vacancies and unemployment to aggregate shocks.
3.3.2 Determining Hours
Once ε is realized, hours are determined by the contract. With (6) holding for all s, workers are fully
compensated for hours variations. So the optimal hours choice is easy to characterize. Given (a,e,ε), the
producer chooses a level of hours subject to (6), i.e., ω = g(h) + b(a). The producer’s optimization problem
for hours is
maxhaε(eh)α − eg(h) − eb(a) (7)
The hours choice satisﬁes
αaε(eh)α−1 = g0(h). (8)
This ﬁrst order condition generates a state-dependent policy function, h(a,e,ε), where hours depends on
(a,e,ε). Holding (a,ε) ﬁxed, as e increases, it is clear that h falls. This is relevant for matching a negative
correlation in observed hours and employment growth at the establishment level.
3.3.3 Determining the level of Employment
The level of employment is determined by the vacancy-posting decision of the producer.31 The recruiting
decision is made knowing ˜ s ≡ (a,e−1,ε−1,θ) where e−1 is the inherited stock of workers and ε−1 is the
30We are grateful to the referee and Borghan Narajabad for suggesting this addition to the model. Acemoglu and Hawkins
(2006) analyze a model where ﬁrms have multiple workers with bargaining. As they note, this approach has many challenges
and their model does not have the rich features of hours per worker and adjustment costs that are the focus of our paper.
31Here vacancies must be reposted each period. See Fujita and Ramey (2005) for a model, where vacancies are a state
variable.
14shock last period used to predict the current one. The state vector ˜ s is similar to s, except for the timing of
decisions on e and the realization of the idiosyncratic proﬁtability shock.
Q(˜ s) is the value of the establishment in state ˜ s and is given by
Q(˜ s) = max{Qh(˜ s),Qn(˜ s),Qf(˜ s)}. (9)
In this optimization problem, Qh(˜ s), Qn(˜ s) and Qf(˜ s) relate to the hiring, no-adjustment and ﬁring options.
The value of hiring workers is given by
Qh(˜ s) = maxvEe,επ(a,ε,e) − F+ − C+(v) + βEQ(˜ s0) (10)
When the producer posts v vacancies, the evolution of employment is
e = e−1(1 − ¯ q) + H(¯ u, ¯ v)v (11)
where ¯ q is the quit rate and H(·) is the rate at which a vacancy is ﬁlled. In this formulation, the vacancy
ﬁlling rate depends on ¯ u, the unemployment rate, and ¯ v, the aggregate vacancy rate. This is where the
aggregate state of the economy inﬂuences the magnitude of the adjustment cost for employment. For some
speciﬁcations, as the labor market tightens (¯ u is low relative to ¯ v), producers ﬁnd that ﬁlling vacancies is
expensive so that more of the labor input variation arises through hours rather than workers.
For a given aggregate state of the economy, H(·) and ¯ q are deterministic from the producer’s viewpoint.
That is, stochastic aspects of the matching process and quits are not part of the uncertainty facing a producer.
There are two types of costs of posting vacancies in the model: a ﬁxed cost component, F+, and a variable
cost component, C+(v). A familiar interpretation of this type of speciﬁcation is based upon recruiting in
Economics. The ﬁxed cost appears in the form of reading numerous ﬁles, ﬂying a committee to interview
and so forth. The variable cost is related to the number of interviews and ﬂy-outs. In terms of matching the
moments, these two costs are relevant for capturing inaction, through F+, and partial adjustment, through
C+(v).
The value of ﬁring workers is given by
Qf(˜ s) = maxfEεπ(a,ε,e−1(1 − ¯ q − f)) − F− − C−(f) + βEQ(˜ s0). (12)
Here the level of employment reﬂects quits and ﬁres. There are ﬁxed, F−, and variable costs, C−(f), of
ﬁring workers.
The value of inaction is given by
Qn(˜ s) = Eεπ(a,ε,e−1(1 − ¯ q)) + βEQ(˜ s0). (13)
Here inaction means no hiring and no ﬁring so that employment at the establishment level falls due to quits.
We assume that any proﬁts realized by producers are consumed by entrepreneurs who own the production
process. These agents are risk neutral and thus are the natural suppliers of insurance to workers. Producers
discount at the same rate, β, as do workers. There is no free entry in the model.
15The solution of this optimization problem generates two decision rules. First, on the extensive margin,
there is the issue of adjustment of the stock of workers. Second, on the intensive margin, if the producer
decides to hire (ﬁre) workers, there is the choice of the magnitude of the adjustment.
3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium for this economy requires optimization by producers and workers and consistency conditions.
For the optimization problems, the components of an equilibrium are:
• an optimal labor contract which solves (4) subject to the participation constraint of the workers,
• a state-contingent hours schedule which solves (8),
• a decision rule for employment adjustment which solves (9),
• a decision rule for workers entailing acceptance or rejection of the contract, as in (5).
With regards to the consistency conditions, the vacancy-ﬁlling rate appearing in the employment tran-
sition constraint in the optimization problem of the producers, (11), depends on θ, an aggregate variable
determined in equilibrium. This function, which is taken as given in the optimization problem of the pro-
ducer, must be consistent with the relationship generated by the model and the data. As described below,
this consistency is enforced in our estimation.
Finally, the unemployment rate follows ¯ u0 = (1−¯ u)S(¯ u, ¯ v)+(1−f(¯ u, ¯ v))u where S(¯ u, ¯ v) is the separation
rate (quits plus layoﬀs) and f(¯ u, ¯ v) is the job ﬁnding rate. In equilibrium, 0 ≤ ¯ u ≤ 1. Because all workers
are either employed or unemployed in our model, we use the transition equation for total employment to
generate an unemployment series to evaluate the moments reported in Table 1.
3.5 Comparison to Standard Search Model
Section 2.1 discusses key moments of worker ﬂows and, following Shimer (2005), points to key diﬀerences
between the data and the standard search model. Here we brieﬂy outline the standard search model relative
to the model we consider. This discussion draws upon Shimer (2005) and Tasci (2006).
There are a couple of key diﬀerences between the models. The standard search model assumes each
producer has at most one worker. Firms without a worker post a vacancy at a (ﬂow) cost and that vacancy
is either ﬁlled or not.
Further, there is no movement on the intensive margin in the standard model. That is, variations in
hours are not studied, and thus there is no state-contingent contract governing the response of hours to
shocks. So matching hours variations is not possible.
16Shocks in the standard model are common across producers.32 Thus the models are not equipped to
match cross-sectional observations.
In the standard model, wages are determined by Nash bargaining. For the moments in Table 1, the
bargaining weight for workers was set at 0.72.33 The bargaining weight clearly determines the split of the
surplus. Further, compensation responds to the aggregate state of the economy through the bargaining
process. In our setting, we create cyclicality of real wages through cyclical variations in the opportunity cost
of workers’ time.
Once workers have a share of the surplus, then the utility ﬂow during a period of unemployment becomes
more important to the analysis. Shimer (2005) assumes a value of leisure at 40% of average productivity.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) take a more general view of the value of leisure beyond the replacement rate
from unemployment insurance and, by matching moments of labor ﬂows and the elasticity of wages with
respect to productivity variations, set the value of leisure at 0.955 (as a fraction of average productivity)
and the bargaining share of workers at only 0.05. As seen in their Table 4, this parameterization resolves
the problem of the relative standard deviation of unemployment and vacancies.
In many respects, the optimal contracting structure, along with the bargaining power held by producers
we explore in our model, is much closer to the parameterization of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006). We
have given the producer all of the bargaining power so that the workers have a zero weight. Further, the
optimal contract stabilizes worker’s ex post utility at the state-contingent value of leisure. The property that
workers receive insurance over employment status is a common feature of optimal contracting models.34 In
our model, we allow work sharing so that hours vary. Hence, there are no ex post employment variations
within a period, and thus inclusion of unemployment insurance in the optimal contract does not arise.
Also, the fact that the utility ﬂow to workers is determined by an exogenous value of leisure can generate
a form of “wage stickiness” as in Hall (2005). The extent of this stickiness depends on the relationship
between the value of leisure and the aggregate shock, b(a) and not the eﬀect of the aggregate shock on
productivity. So here, the degree of “wage stickiness” is endogenous rather than imposed. This property of
our model reﬂects the optimal insurance features of the labor contract rather than an assumption of inﬂexible
real wages. Further, ex post wages per se are not allocative in our framework. Instead, hours respond to the
state and satisfy (8), and compensation adjusts so that utility is equal to U(ω − g(h)) = U(b(a)) ex post.
Thus the model has implications for the cross-sectional distributions of hours and compensation which we
do not exploit.
Finally, the standard model has a free entry condition, which pins down the value of a vacancy at zero.
Instead, we have producers optimally choosing the number of vacancies to post. Our focus is more on the
intensive margin of adjustment in the number of vacancies per producer rather than the number of producers.
32Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) have job-speciﬁc shocks, which they use to generate job destruction. Cole and Rogerson
(1999) also allow for idiosyncratic shocks, but ﬁnd that these shocks do not have aggregate eﬀects.
33See Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) for a discussion of the parameterization of the bargaining weight.
34See Azariadis (1975) for details as well as a model in which there are unemployment risks due to the absence of severance
pay and work sharing.
174 Numerical Analysis
The optimization problem for an individual producer is solved through value function iteration of (9) and
the functions used to deﬁne this value. There is no household optimization to consider: as long as V e = V u,
workers are indiﬀerent between accepting a job or not.
To solve the producer’s optimization problem, we need a number of parameterized functions. We discuss
the functions here and then summarize them, along with parameterizations in Table 4. We specify and
parameterize the model at a monthly frequency. Thus the moments associated with worker ﬂows are not
time aggregated.
4.1 Functional Forms
As argued above, the wage, ω(s), will satisfy U(ω(s) − g(h(s))) = U(b(a)) so that ω(s) = b(a) + g(h(s)) for
all s. We parameterize the disutility of work, g(h), so that
ω(s) = b(a) + ω1h(s)ζ (14)
is the compensation required to guarantee the utility level U(b(a)) in all states, s. Here ζ is important
for determining the utility cost of variations in hours. Generally, if ζ is low, then variations in hours are
inexpensive, so that much of the adjustment of the labor input will be on the intensive margin and not
through variations in the number of workers.
We have allowed the workers value of leisure to depend on the aggregate shock, a. Thus we assume
b(a) = b0ab
1
. The parameter b1 thus governs the sensitivity of the worker’s outside option to aggregate
productivity.










Following the literature, the matching function is speciﬁed with constant returns to scale and is given by
m = µ¯ uγ¯ v1−γ = µ¯ vθ−γ (15)
where θ ≡ ¯ v
¯ u measures the tightness of labor markets. From this relationship, we obtain two additional
functions: the vacancy ﬁlling rate for producers and the job ﬁnding rate for workers. Let H = m
¯ v be the
vacancy ﬁlling rate. Using the speciﬁcation of the match rate, (15),
H = µθ−γ. (16)
Let f = m
¯ u be the job ﬁnding rate for workers. Using (15) again,
f = µθ1−γ. (17)
Of course, these three functions are related by common parameters.
18The solution of the producers optimization problem requires the vacancy ﬁlling rate in the transition
equation for employment, (11). Using (16), the vacancy ﬁlling rate depend on the current state of labor
market tightness, θ. Thus the solution of the producer’s optimization problem requires it to know the
evolution of θ in the equilibrium of the model economy. Given the heterogeneity of producers, forecasting
labor market tightness requires knowledge of the cross sectional distribution of workers and producer speciﬁc
proﬁtability as well as the aggregate variables. This is a complex forecasting problem computationally.
To simplify the analysis, we assume a form of bounded rationality or limited information by producers:
they forecast θ using an AR(1) process. For this reason, we have included θ in the state vector of the
producer.
We estimate an AR(1) representation of θ from our data. From that regression, the AR(1) coeﬃcient on
θ is 0.93. The R2 from the regression is 0.96. The simple autoregressive structure does an outstanding job
of capturing the dynamics of labor market tightness in our sample.
For our simulations, we impose beliefs on the producer. In the estimation of the model, we add moments
to guarantee that the process for θ is consistent with beliefs of producers.
4.2 Choosing Parameters
We estimate the parameters for the vacancy ﬁlling rate directly from data. We also calibrate some of the
other parameters. This is for the purpose of the simulations of the model. We return to this discussion in
the context of estimating the model.
4.2.1 Estimated Functions
This section reports our estimates of the parameters for the vacancy ﬁlling rate function. This estimation
is done directly from the data and is thus outside of the solution of the producer’s dynamic optimization
problem.
For this analysis as well as the estimation, we construct a monthly vacancy series using JOLTS. The
monthly unemployment data is from the CPS. Relative to Shimer (2005), our data are higher frequency and
we use the JOLTS vacancy series. For monthly labor productivity, we construct a series using the Industrial
Production Index from the FRB and total hours using employment and hours data from the BLS. Labor
market tightness, θ, is the log of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. All series are converted to logs and then
HP ﬁltered.
The primary relationship estimated directly from these data is the matching function, where the logarithm
of the match rate is regressed on the logarithm of labor market tightness. In keeping with a large part of
the literature we impose constant returns to scale. With this restriction we estimate γ = 0.36, which is
considerably lower than the estimate of 0.72 reported in Shimer (2005) and closer to the estimate of 0.235
reported in Hall (2005). The diﬀerence in estimates may reﬂect the use of the JOLTS data rather than the
Conference Board vacancies numbers and the use of diﬀerent sample periods. The logarithm of the constant
19Relationship Parameter
discount rate (β) 0.9966
curvature of proﬁt function (α) 0.65
elasticity of disutility of hours (ζ) 2.90
serial correlation of aggregate shocks (ρa) 0.95
standard deviation of innovation to aggregate shocks (σa) 0.0016
curvature of matching function (γ) 0.36
Table 4: Calibrated Parameters
is estimated at 0.0072. Hence µ from (15) is estimated at 1.0072.35
To check on these estimates, we measure the monthly job ﬁnding rate of workers at 0.606. Using (17),
the estimate of γ = 0.358 and the mean value of θ = 0.46 imply µ = 1.0009. These are very close to the
point estimate from the regression.
4.2.2 Calibrated Parameters
We calibrate a subset of our parameters, summarized in Table 4. We use this calibration for the simulation
results in Section 5 and in the estimation reported in Section 6.
As the model is monthly, we set β = 0.9966. There are some parameters, b0 and ω1 which are set to
match average establishment size and average hours.36 The value of α is in the range for this parameter as
estimated in Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004). The calibrated value of ζ follows Caballero and Engel
(1993).
A couple of these parameters are particularly important for the analysis. The wage elasticity, ζ, governs
the cost of adjusting hours and is relevant for matching the relative standard deviation of hours growth to
employment growth.
The common component of the proﬁtability shock, a, is modeled as a log normal AR(1) process. We set
the serial correlation, ρa, and standard deviation of the innovation to the process, σa, to bring the models
predictions close to the serial correlation and variance of aggregate employment.
5 Simulations
To get a sense of how the model performs, we conduct a preliminary analysis by simulating the model for
some two speciﬁcations of adjustment costs. In particular we look at the following special cases:
35The standard error on the estimate of γ and µ equals 0.02.
36For our model, the value of b0 inﬂuences the size of producers, not the diﬀerence in utility between employed and unemployed
agents. We set b0 = 1.12 and ω1 = 0.000013 so that average establishment size is 60 and hours equal 40 on average. The
average size of 60 is consistent with the data set, described in Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004), used to estimate α.
20• NC: No Costs of Adjusting the labor force,
• H-Fix: Fixed Costs of Posting Vacancies,
The exact speciﬁcation of the vacancy posting costs are provided below. The other parameters are set as
described in Table 4.
For each speciﬁcation of adjustment costs, we do two experiments with the sensitivity of the value of
leisure with respect to the aggregate shock. In one case, we set b1 = 0 so that the value of leisure is constant.
In the other, we set b1 = 0.5 so that the value of leisure and thus aggregate wages are procyclical.
Further, for these simulations we set producers beliefs directly by assuming a functional relationship
between the vacancy ﬁlling rate and a. That is, we impose H = ν0aν1 to approximate H(θ) and the
dependence of θ on a.37
For these simulations, the number of establishments was set at 8000 and the simulation length was 360
months. There were 21 points in the space of idiosyncratic shocks. The simulation results did not change
much when these settings were expanded to more time periods, more establishments and a ﬁner grid.
5.1 Key Moments
The simulation exercise is structured around three set of moments from the data. These moments are of
interest partly because they are associated with empirical puzzles. Here we discuss these key moments and
then study how our model addresses them.
The ﬁrst set of key moments concerns aggregate variables. We focus on the variability of unemployment
and vacancies as well as their comovement. These moments are summarized in Table 5 and diﬀer from those
in Table 1 as we are using monthly JOLTS data to compute these statistics. In addition, we look at the
comovement of aggregate wages and productivity.
The second key moment is the observed negative correlation between employment and hours growth at
the establishment level, as indicated in Table 2. The third set of moments is the cross-sectional distribution
of net employment growth, summarized in Table 3.
The challenge is to ﬁnd a model capable of matching these disparate observations from micro and ag-
gregate data. As illustrated in the simulations below, our model’s inclusion of non-convex costs of vacancy
creation along with substantial dispersion in establishment-speciﬁc shocks provides a basis for matching
these moments.
5.2 Simulation Results
Table 5 presents the main moments of interest for the cases listed above. Almost all of these moments are
calculated on a monthly basis, the same frequency as most of the data. The exception are the two quarterly
37For the simulations we set ν0 = 1.3,ν1 = −30.00. This produces a serial correlation of θ around 0.85 across the treatments
and thus is a good approximation to the estimated process of θ for these simulations.
21moments from the LRD, σ˜ h/σ˜ e and corr(˜ h, ˜ e), which are calculated for each quarter by sampling from the
simulated monthly data.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation, NC, has no costs of hiring and ﬁring. The consequence of this is substantial
volatility in unemployment, matching and job ﬁnding, relative to the other cases. In contrast, there is
relatively little variability in vacancies. This diﬀerence in variability of unemployment relative to vacancies
reﬂects the fact that unemployment is a state variable. The model does generate a Beveridge curve.
Due to the assumption that hours but not employment respond immediately to the idiosyncratic shock,
adjustment of both hours and employees occurs. But without adjustment costs, much of the variation is in
the form of employment growth, so σ˜ h/σ˜ e is much higher in the data than in the model. Interestingly, the
model without adjustment costs reproduces the negative corr(˜ h, ˜ e) in the data.
Looking at employment adjustment, it is clear that in the absence of adjustment costs, the volatility
of employment growth at the establishment level is excessive relative to observation. In the simulation it
is not uncommon to see employment growth, in absolute value, in excess of 10%. This ﬁnding should not
be surprising given the volatility of the idiosyncratic shocks. Clearly a key issue in the estimation is the
identiﬁcation of the costs of creating vacancies and the other adjustment costs from the variance of the
idiosyncratic shocks.
The second row of the table retains the assumption of no adjustment costs but assumes that the value of
home production is procyclical: b1 = 0.5. This creates positive correlation between the aggregate component
of proﬁtability and the average wage rate.
Relative to these results, the introduction of costs of posting vacancies and ﬁring are relevant for reducing
the variability of job and worker ﬂows. To illustrate, the H-ﬁx speciﬁcation introduces a ﬁxed cost, F+ = 1,
into the model. At this value of F+, the average adjustment cost incurred, given in the “AC” column,
is about 4.7% of monthly gross proﬁts (revenues less compensation to workers). With this relatively high
adjustment cost, there is relatively more inaction, i.e. more employment growth in the (−2.5,2.5) bin of the
employment distribution and less frequent bursts of job creation and destruction. Further, the distribution
of employment growth is skewed: there are few small positive employment growth rates but more small
negative employment growth rates. In this sense, the adjustment cost alters the distribution of employment
variation.
Since the quit rate is assumed positive (at 1.7%), there are no observations of zero net employment
growth. There is substantial inaction on vacancies: 93% of the observations entail zero vacancies compared
to 44.6% in the NC speciﬁcation.
The Beveridge curve is still present in the simulated data. The ﬁxed cost increases the variability
of vacancies, relative to the no-adjustment cost case. There is a negative correlation between hours and







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Employment and Hours: Establishment Level Growth Rates
There is a second speciﬁcation with ﬁxed costs of posting vacancies in which we allow the ﬂow value
of unemployment to depend on a: b(a) = b0ab
1
with b1 = 0.5. In this model, labeled H-Fix, b1 = 0.5,
variations in a are positively correlated with the value of leisure so that in high productivity states, wages
rise as well. In theory, this ought to reduce the value of creating vacancies in high productivity states.
We ﬁnd that, relative to the H-ﬁx case, the variability of vacancies falls by around 5% while the variability
of unemployment falls by nearly 20%. Further, the correlation between unemployment and vacancies is clearly
reduced. This parameterization of the model does a better job of matching the correlation between wages
and average labor productivity.
Interestingly, none of the plant speciﬁc moments are inﬂuenced by the state dependent outside option of
the worker. This reinforces the view that the plant-level moments are reﬂecting cross sectional rather than
time series variation.
5.3 Inspecting the Mechanism
This is a rather rich model, and the mapping from parameters to moments is not immediately clear. To
help build further intuition about the models mechanics, we explore in more detail the speciﬁcation with a
ﬁxed costs of posting vacancies, the H-ﬁx in Table 5. We do so here by presenting two ﬁgures related to key
moments.
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Figure 2: Unemployment and Vacancies: Aggregate
Figure 1 shows simulation results at the establishment level. The point here is to understand how an
establishment, in the presence of ﬁxed costs of posting vacancies, responds to variations in proﬁtability.
These simulations assume b1 = 0.38
Two points are illustrated in Figure 1. First, hours and employment are negatively correlated. When
the producer is subject to an increase in proﬁtability, starting around period 17 in Figure 1, hours respond
immediately. In period 19, the adjustment cost is paid and employment adjusts to a higher level. Hours are
reduced as employment expands, and this produces the negative correlation between hours and employment
growth. When proﬁtability falls around period 25, ﬁrst hours and then employment is reduced.
Second, due to the adjustment costs, employment does not always respond to variations in proﬁtability.
This is evident from period 34-40 in Figure 1. Though proﬁtability has risen in this period, there is no
employment response. Instead, ﬂuctuations in proﬁtability are met by variations in hours. Thus variations
in adjustment are sporadic.
Figure 2 shows simulation results for unemployment, vacancies and the aggregate component of the
proﬁtability shock. These aggregate variables are obtained by the aggregation of the establishment level
results for the same simulation shown in Figure 1. There are two cases shown here: b1 = 0 and b1 = 0.50.
The Beveridge curve is apparent in these simulations. When there is a positive aggregate shock, such
as around period 10, there is an immediate response in the creation of vacancies. Unemployment falls as
38As noted earlier, behavior at the producer level is essentially independent of b1.
25vacancies are ﬁlled. The strength of this response depends partly on the cost of creating vacancies and on
the rate in which vacancies are ﬁlled.
The main diﬀerence eﬀect of having the value of leisure (home production) sensitive to the aggregate
state, i.e. b1 = 0.50, is that unemployment falls less rapidly in response to a positive aggregate shock. This
is consistent with the moments presented in Table 5: it is the standard deviation of unemployment which
responds to the increase in b1.
There are inherent diﬀerences in the dynamics of the response of unemployment and vacancies to the
shock. In most of these search and matching models, unemployment is a state variable but vacancies are
not.39 As reported in Table 1, the serial correlations of unemployment and vacancies are about the same.
As is evident from Figure 2, the serial correlation of vacancies created by the model is substantially less than
the serial correlation of unemployment.
6 Estimation
The key parameters in our study are those determining the costs of hiring and ﬁring as well as the driving
process for the shocks at the establishment level. These parameters are estimated through a simulated
method of moments procedure. Other parameters are calibrated at the values in Table 4.
6.1 Methodology
The estimation entails ﬁnding the vector of structural parameters, Λ, to minimize the (weighted) distance
between moments from the data, Γd, and moments produced from a simulation of the model given a vector
of parameters, Γs(Λ). Thus our estimate of Λ minimizes £(Λ) where
£(Λ) ≡ (Γd − Γs(Λ))W(Γd − Γs(Λ))0 (18)
and W is a weighting matrix.40
This minimization problem is solved by simulation to create a mapping from Λ to the moments. The
methodology is as follows. Given vector Λ, we solve the producer’s dynamic optimization problem using value
function iteration. From this and the solution to (8), we generate policy functions at the producer level for
employment, vacancies and hours. The model is solved at a monthly frequency. Using these policy functions,
we create a simulated data set at the producer level. Given this, we compute the microeconomic moments
directly from the data and, by aggregation, compute aggregate ﬂows of vacancies and unemployment as well.
In this manner, we obtain Γs(Λ).
The simulated data set consists of 8000 establishments simulated over 360 months. The results are
robust to increasing the number of establishments and time periods. The number of points in the grid for
the idiosyncratic shock was 21.
39As noted earlier, one exception is Fujita and Ramey (2005).
40In the discussion which follows, W is an identity matrix that produces consistent estimates of Λ.




0 ,b1,ρε,σε). The ﬁrst
three parameters represent the cost of posting vacancies and the second three are ﬁring costs. The parameters
(ρε,σε) characterize the log normal AR(1) process for the establishment-speciﬁc proﬁtability shocks, where
σε is the standard deviation of the innovation to the process. The ﬁnal parameter, b1, captures the sensitivity
of the worker’s value of leisure to variations in aggregate proﬁtability. Other parameters are set at the values
used in the simulation exercises, summarized in Table 4.
We separate the moments to match into four categories:
• Equilibrium: The estimated model must mimic the regression results for AR(1) representation of
labor market tightness, denoted as ρθ.
• Unemployment and Vacancies: The key moments are σ(¯ u), σ(¯ v) and corr(¯ u, ¯ v). The moments are
reported in Table 5.
• Hours and Employment: The key moments are corr(∆e,∆h) and σ˜ h/σ˜ e. These are in terms of
growth rates and are measured in the data and simulation quarterly, as reported in Table 2 for the
establishment level.
• Worker and Job Flows: The key moments are from the distribution of ∆e reported in Table 3.
• Aggregate Wages and Productivity: The key moment is the coeﬃcient from a regression of (log)
average hourly wages on (log) average labor productivity. This moment, which has no structural
interpretation, is denoted ω|p.
These moments are chosen largely because they characterize basic aspects of worker and job ﬂows at
both the microeconomic and aggregate levels. This is in accord with the point of our analysis: to investigate
a search model capable of jointly explaining both microeconomic and macroeconomic facts.
The inclusion of the AR(1) coeﬃcient for labor market tightness implies that the beliefs of the producers
in the model, which conform with the empirically observed serial correlation, match the data. In this way,
we also ensure that we have an equilibrium: the beliefs of the producers are mutually consistent.
6.2 Results
The estimation is undertaken for four cases: two with hiring costs and two with ﬁring costs. While the model
focuses on the signiﬁcance of search and thus hiring costs, we also study the implications of ﬁring costs. This
provides a perspective on the role of search costs and also on the more general topic of the source of labor
adjustment costs in general.
Each of the two hiring cost speciﬁcations includes a ﬁxed cost of vacancies in conjunction with either
a quadratic or linear cost of vacancies. Each of the two ﬁring cost cases includes a ﬁxed cost of ﬁring in









1 = 2) 0.056 0.001 0 0 0.369 0.338 0.186 0.550 0.059
Fixed, Linear (c
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1 = 2) 0 0 0.220 0.858 0.575 0.894 0.115 0 0.048
Fixed, Linear (c
−
1 = 1) 0 0 0.112 0.024 0.487 0.459 0.196 0.235 0.024
Table 6: Estimation Results: Parameters
The results are reported in the following two tables. The parameter estimates are reported in Table 6.
The moments of the models relative to data are summarized in Table 7 and discussed in section 7.1.1.
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates for the four speciﬁcations, adjustment costs as a percentage of
gross proﬁts (AC) and the ﬁt of the model from (18). For both hiring and ﬁring costs, the ﬁxed and quadratic
speciﬁcations do not do as well as the ﬁxed and linear adjustment cost cases. The speciﬁcation with linear
and ﬁxed costs of hiring workers ﬁts the moments essentially as well as the speciﬁcation with linear and ﬁxed
hiring costs. We have not been able to improve the ﬁt using a speciﬁcation with both hiring and ﬁring costs.
Note that this does not mean the model with hiring costs is observationally equivalent to the model
with ﬁring costs. Looking at the distribution of net employment growth, the speciﬁcations clearly have very
diﬀerent implications for these moments.
For the speciﬁcation with ﬁxed and linear hiring costs, the estimated costs of adjustment (paid) are
around 0.77% of gross proﬁts. The costs are much lower with ﬁring costs since workers quit at an exogenous
rate and thus producers can avoid this cost. The idiosyncratic proﬁtability shocks are serially correlated and
much more variable than aggregate shocks. The value of b1 in both speciﬁcations is around 0.5 indicating a
strong response of the value of leisure to aggregate proﬁtability.
7 Evaluation of Results
This section summarizes our ﬁndings. We ﬁrst discuss how well the estimated model matches key moments.
We then discuss other implications of the estimated model.
7.1 Explaining the Moments and Additional Facts
From Table 6, the speciﬁcation with ﬁxed and linear hiring costs and with ﬁxed and linear ﬁring costs seem
to ﬁt the moments equally well. Given the focus of this paper on hiring costs, we call this the “best ﬁt”
speciﬁcation in the discussion which follows though we often refer to the ﬁring cost results as well. Here we
discuss how that model matches the moments in more detail and also touch on other moments.
287.1.1 Matching the Moments
Table 7 summarizes the moment implications for the cases including the best ﬁt. Both of the speciﬁcations
with linear adjustment costs do well matching moments in many dimensions. Both models, largely through
b1 are able to match the regression coeﬃcient of wages on average labor productivity, ω|p. With regard to
aggregate facts, the models matches the variability of unemployment and vacancies and produce a Beveridge
curve. At the establishment level, the estimated models match the relative volatility of hours and employment
growth as well as the negative correlation between hours and workers.
Further, both models reproduce the serial correlation in θ from the data. Thus in both cases, the beliefs
of producers about the evolution of labor market tightness and thus the vacancy ﬁlling rate are consistent
with the data and the outcome of the model economy.
Diﬀerences between the speciﬁcations emerge in the distribution of employment growth at the producer
level. The model with hiring costs predicts too little hiring and an excessive level of net employment growth
smaller than 10% as there are no ﬁring costs. Conversely, the model with ﬁring costs produces fewer burst of
ﬁring but some intermediate rates of positive net employment growth. Neither model alone is fully capable

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30As noted earlier, we set ω|p at 0.45. If we reduce the sensitivity of aggregate wages to average labor
productivity and set ω|p = 0.26, our conclusions do not change very much. The models with linear hiring
and ﬁring still ﬁt the moments best. The lower ω|p leads to a lower estimate of b1. Consistent with the
simulation results, the variability of both unemployment and vacancies is higher. As noted in the discussion
of the simulation results, the establishment level moments are not very sensitive to changes in b1. Hence
changing the ω|p moment does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on our estimates of adjustment frictions.
7.2 TFP vs. Average Labor Productivity: Unemployment and Vacancies
One of the more interesting points of diﬀerence between the empirical literature on aggregate search models
and the macroeconomic literature based on the stochastic growth model is the measurement of productivity.
The search literature largely looks at average labor productivity (ALP), while the macroeconomics literature
focuses on total factor productivity (TFP) as an exogenous shock.
In this paper, we are closer to the tradition of the stochastic growth model. We have treated proﬁtability
as exogenous where the proﬁtability shock summarizes both technological and demand factors inﬂuencing the
revenues of a producer. If the model is competitive, then the proﬁtability shock is most naturally interpreted
as a variation in technology.41
In our model, revenues are speciﬁed in (3). For the competitive economy, revenues are the same as
output. If labor is freely mobile (no adjustment costs and no rigidities due to timing assumptions) between
production sites, then the cross sectional distribution of ALP will be degenerate. Further, ﬂuctuations in
the average product of labor will reﬂect the dependence of worker opportunities on aggregate productivity,
b1 in the model.
Generally though, TFP and ALP are not the same. There are two economic forces that separate these
measures of productivity: (i) frictions in the adjustment process and (ii) idiosyncratic shocks.
To see these inﬂuences, think about two extreme economies. In one, suppose that labor ﬂows freely
across producers, and in the second, suppose there are frictions in labor ﬂows. Suppose the distribution of
idiosyncratic shocks is the same in the two economies and is ﬁxed over time.
As aggregate TFP varies, ALP varies in both of these economies. For ﬁxed TFP in the second economy,
ALP increases as labor ﬂows from less productive to more productive producers. Thus, variations in ALP
will generally reﬂect both TFP and frictions.
Still, ALP is much easier to measure and thus plays a prominent role in the empirical literature. One of
the advantages of our simulation environment is that we can use our model to generate a measure of ALP,
for producer i in period t as
atεi,t(ei,thi,t)α−1. (19)
41Allowing monopolistic competition allows for an interpretation of α as including a markup and the shocks to revenue
including a relative demand disturbance. As the model studied here does not include product diﬀerentiation, α and the shocks
should be more narrowly interpreted.
31The value of α used for our analysis is 0.65. In the context of the model, α < 1 reﬂects the presence of ﬁxed
factors of production such as managerial ability, structures and predetermined components of the equipment
stock.
With these diﬀerences between TFP and ALP in mind, we return to a discussion of moments. The puzzle
posed by Shimer (2005) concerns the standard deviation of unemployment and vacancies relative to ALP, as
shown in Table 1. Our estimation, in contrast, has not focused on this moment per se but rather we target
the absolute standard deviations on unemployment and vacancies.
Given our estimated model, we simulate average labor productivity and relate it to unemployment and
vacancies. Our results are summarized in Table 8 along with relevant moments from the JOLTS data.
Here our measure of average labor productivity is denoted p. For the simulated data, it was computed at
the establishment level using (19). The aggregate measure is total output divided by aggregate hours. For
the actual data, ALP was computed using industrial production as a measure of output and total hours, eh,
for production workers as the measure of labor input. Though the data on vacancies are from JOLTS, rather
than the Conference Board, and are at a monthly frequency, the standard deviations of unemployment and
vacancies are similar in magnitude to those reported in Shimer (2005).
Moment JOLTS data Estimated Model
σ¯ u/σa - 28.04
σ¯ v/σa - 21.49
σ¯ u/σp 7.64 43.36
σ¯ v/σp 10.34 33.21
corr(θ,p) -0.695 0.439
corr(a,p) - 0.598
Table 8: Unemployment, Vacancies and Average Labor Productivity
From this table there is clearly a substantial diﬀerence between a and p: the correlation is 0.60. As
discussed earlier, this reﬂects the interaction of frictions in labor ﬂows and the idiosyncratic shocks in the
estimated model.
There are two measures of the standard deviations of ¯ u and ¯ v relative to productivity. Looking at a,
both unemployment and vacancies are substantially more volatile than productivity. This is also true when
we use p as a productivity measure. The magniﬁcation puzzle isolated by Shimer (2005) is not present in
this model.
The volatility of unemployment and vacancies relative to the variability in a stems from a few features
of the labor market in our model. First, producers have all of the bargaining power. Second, the outside
option of workers depends on a through the parameter b1. Recall that b1 is estimated in the model and is
useful in matching the relationship between compensation and productivity, the ω|p moment.
To see the linkages, an increase in a leads to an increase in the proﬁtability of hiring, which creates
32incentives on both the extensive and the intensive margins: a larger fraction of producers to post vacancies
and post more vacancies. But, as b1 > 0, the outside option of the workers is more valuable and thus average
compensation rises with a. This eﬀect dampens incentives for vacancy creation.
It is also worth noting that the time-series volatility of p is much less than the volatility of a. This is
consistent with the intuition above that, in eﬀect, with the estimated value of b1 the economy is operating
on a relatively ﬂat labor supply curve so that average productivity ﬂuctuates less than the aggregate shock.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) argue that the elasticity of wages to average labor productivity is one for
Shimer (2005). To study the importance of this elasticity for our results, we estimated a version of our model
with ω|p = 1.0 instead of ω|p = 0.0.45. This change in the moments increased the estimate of b1 from 0.5
to 0.87. For this case, there is still no ampliﬁcation puzzle: σ¯ u/σp = 26.80 and σ¯ v/σp = 24.7. Apparently,
our model can resolve the magniﬁcation puzzle with the same response of aggregate wages to productivity
as assumed in Shimer (2005).
The behavior of ALP and labor market tightness poses another challenge to the analysis. As shown in
Table 8, there is a negative correlation between labor market tightness and average labor productivity in
the sample period data. But in the estimated model, as reported in the table, corr(θ,p) > 0. In Shimer
(2005), the relationship between productivity and labor market tightness is not stable across sub-samples
of the data set. For his overall sample, as in our model, the correlation is positive, but for the sub-samples
covered by JOLTS this correlation is also negative.
This diﬀerence between model and data may reﬂect the fact that average labor productivity is endogenous.
Thus reverse causality may be an important consideration.
One link between ALP and θ comes from the eﬀects of a, the aggregate exogenous driving force in the
model. As a increases, so does p, as indicated by the positive correlation in the simulated data. Further,
the correlation between a and θ is about 0.8 in the simulated data. This leads to the positive correlation
between θ and p and is captured in the model.
The correlation between ALP and θ may also reﬂect other inﬂuences on ALP. For example, suppose there
are variations in θ independent of a. A reduction in θ leads, based upon the regression results in section
4.2.1, to an increase in the vacancy ﬁlling rate. In this way, search frictions may be endogenously reduced,
leading to a more eﬃcient allocation of labor across producers. This reallocation is reﬂected in a higher
value of p and a negative correlation between θ and p. In fact, in the data p is positively correlated with the
vacancy ﬁlling rate.
Understanding the instability between ALP and labor market tightness, as well as the factors inﬂuencing
the interaction, remains an area for further work.
337.3 Is Search the Basis for Models of Adjustment Costs?
There is a vast literature on the implications of labor adjustment costs for employment dynamics.42 But to
some extent, this literature suﬀers from the problem that the adjustment costs appear as a black box. When
pressed, researchers sometimes use a search model as a basis for the costs of creating new jobs.
Given our study of a search model with costs of posting vacancies, it is natural to ask how the results of
the model relate to ﬁndings on adjustment costs of labor. Superﬁcially, the mapping seems solid. The ﬁxed
costs of posting vacancies match with the ﬁxed cost of adjusting labor, as in the structural model of Cooper,
Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004). The quadratic adjustment costs, which generate partial adjustment, may
simply reﬂect the matching process in which only a fraction of vacancies are ﬁlled each period.43
Though it is outside this paper, the mapping between the search model and the labor adjustment cost
models can be studied more formally. One possibility, along the lines of indirect inference, is to simulate
data for the model estimated here. Then, consider a structural model of labor adjustment costs, along the
lines of Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004), which incorporates both convex and non-convex costs of
adjustment. One could estimate the labor adjustment cost parameters to match relevant moments from the
data simulated from the search model.
Clearly the results reported above suggest that the search model is capable of capturing many but not
all aspects of the data. We ﬁnd evidence that adjustment costs associated with the ﬁring of workers seem
important as well. Thus search alone is likely not to be the entire story.
7.4 Idiosyncratic Shocks
An important part of the speciﬁcation of the model is the presence of producer speciﬁc proﬁtability shocks.
The standard deviation of the innovation to the idiosyncratic component of proﬁtability is estimated at
0.227. Table 9 shows how some of the key moments respond to a reduction in σε from this estimated value
to 0.057. A key lesson from these results is that the moments of the model economy do depend on the
distribution of establishment shocks: these shocks are not smoothed out by aggregation.
As is evident from the table, the correlation between unemployment and vacancies becomes less negative
for lower values of σε. This is indicative of the fact that parameters describing microeconomic objects can
impact aggregate variables in this framework. Further, the distribution of employment adjustment is more
condensed as σε falls. This makes sense since there are fewer large draws of the idiosyncratic shock and so,
given adjustment costs, less variability in employment growth.
Overall, the results of Table 9 help illustrate the importance of simultaneously matching the micro and
the macro moments. To match the micro moments, adjustment costs and a high variance of idiosyncratic
shocks must both be present. Moreover, without the high variance of idiosyncratic shocks but with the
42See Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) and Nickell (1986) for example.
43Matching that feature would require the model to have more of a stochastic matching structure. In our model, there is a
deterministic relationship between vacancies and employment at the establishment level.
34σε corr(u,v) −0.10 > ∆e −0.10 < ∆e < −0.025 −0.025 < ∆e < 0.025
0.2266 -0.9022 0.0519 0.0712 0.7938
0.17 -0.8413 0.0182 0.0585 0.8493
0.1133 -0.6833 0.0002 0.0352 0.8918
0.057 -0.5382 0 0.0007 0.9249
Table 9: Eﬀects of Reducing σε
adjustment costs, we cannot match the macro moments such as the Beveridge curve.
7.4.1 Other Implications
There are a couple of additional facts, used to motivate this study, which were not included in the set of
moments. Table 3, for example, includes the hires and separation patterns across growth rate bins showing
that the margin for adjustment for expanding (contracting) ﬁrms is primarily hires (separations). For
the estimated model, we ﬁnd analogous patterns. For example, in the growth rate bin for establishments
expanding by more than 10%, our estimated model implies the hiring rate is 21% and the separation rate is
2%. These estimates compare to the JOLTS estimates of a 30% hiring rate and 4% separation rate for the
same growth rate bin from Table 3.
As noted earlier, there is substantial inaction on vacancies and employment growth at the establishment
level. In 32% of the (size weighted) observations, net employment growth is zero. Further, 45% of the
observations entail zero vacancies created. The best ﬁt model with hiring costs did not ﬁt these facts. It
predicts no observations of zero net employment growth and too much inaction in vacancies: there are no
vacancies in about 93% of the simulated observations. The best ﬁt model with ﬁring costs has some inaction
in employment growth and vacancy inaction in 73% of the observations.
This inability to match the inaction in net employment reﬂects the underlying assumption of the search
model: adjustment costs are associated with gross rather than net hires and quits are deterministic. In our
speciﬁcation, the non-convex cost of posting vacancies leads to zero gross employment growth in about 78%
of our observation. This does not translate into inaction in net employment growth because of the exogenous
quits.
Table 2 contained moments on employment and hours beyond the moments emphasized in our estimation.
The model was estimated to ﬁt the relative standard deviations of hours to employment growth and the
correlation between them at the establishment level on a quarterly basis. The estimated model does well
matching these moments.
This table shows some additional moments at both the establishment and aggregate levels. In terms of
microeconomic observations, the correlation between lagged hours growth and employment is 0.184 in the
plant-level data. Using our best estimates, the simulated data shows a slightly negative correlation. This
35seems to reﬂect time aggregation. In keeping with data, we report quarterly moments even though our
model is solved on a monthly basis. If instead we look at monthly simulated data, the correlation between
lagged hours growth and employment rises to 0.43. This correlation reﬂects our basic intuition about the
dynamic interaction between hours and employment growth: the initial response of a producer to a shock
is through hours with the employment adjustment (if it occurs) arising later. The problem is that at the
quarterly frequency, this relationship is obscured by the lack of persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks and
the multiple decision periods between lagged hours and current employment adjustment.
Regarding aggregate implications, Table 2 highlights diﬀerences between comovement and variability of
hours and employees at the establishment and aggregate levels. Our model does not match these moments
well at the quarterly frequency. But, as noted above for the establishment-level moments, if we look at
monthly frequency, the correlation between lagged hours growth and and employment growth is 0.396.
Moment Plant Aggregate
LRD Est. Model LRD Est. Model
σ∆h
σ∆e 0.96 0.99 0.55 0.93
Corr(∆h,∆e) -0.296 -0.363 0.545 0.013
Corr(∆h−1,∆e) 0.184 -0.019 0.519 -0.0983
∗ Seasonal and Aggregate Eﬀects removed from establishment-level moments. Seasonal Eﬀects removed from aggregate-level
moments. All moments are at a quarterly frequency.
Table 10: Hours and Employment Adjustment: Basic Facts from the LRD∗
Both unemployment and vacancies are serially correlated. Those moments were not used in the esti-
mation. In the JOLTS data, the serial correlation of ¯ u is 0.92 and of ¯ v is 0.91. From simulations of the
estimated model with hiring costs, we ﬁnd that the serial correlation of unemployment is 0.96 and the serial
correlation of vacancies is 0.81. Thus the model does not quite generate the required serial correlation of
vacancies.
8 Extensions
Here we brieﬂy discuss some aspects of the model and empirical approach which deserve additional consid-
eration. The focus is on variants of the model to bring it closer to observations.
368.1 Size Distribution of Establishments
Our model has a rich cross-sectional distribution of proﬁtability. This translates into cross-sectional distrib-
utions of a variety of variables. While we have looked as some of these in detail, such as employment growth
and hours growth, these moments have all been size weighted, using employment. These same moments
can be calculated as simple, not size-weighted, statistics. A comparison of these two calculations is then
informative about the size distribution of establishments. Moreover, the frictions (e.g., adjustment costs)
likely vary by the size of the ﬁrm, and exploring the variation across the size distribution of establishments
could be provide further information about these frictions.
8.2 Capital
As with most of the search models, there is no explicit capital in the model. There are three implications of
this structure worth noting.
First, the absence of capital makes interpreting α more diﬃcult. One might assume that capital ﬂows
freely across production sites so that underlying the revenue function is a capital decision. Or, one might
assume that capital is determined at the time the establishment is created. In that case, α would be
interpreted as labor’s share. Including capital explicitly in the model would make the interpretation as well
as the calibration/estimation of α more transparent.
Second, it is natural to think that there are costs of adjusting capital as well. How capital adjustment costs
interact with labor demand and how the costs of labor and capital adjustment interact remains unexplored.
Third, workers in the model consumed their compensation. If there was capital, then workers could save.
8.3 Bargaining Power for Workers
The model assumes that producers make workers a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer so that, in equilibrium, employed
and unemployed workers receive the same payoﬀ, U(b(a)). This assumption considerably simpliﬁes the
analysis since workers need not consider the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy. To
do so would require the state space for workers’ decisions to include the cross-sectional distribution of
establishment proﬁtability shocks. In addition, solving for an equilibrium would require the determination
of the market-clearing equilibrium level of expected utility on a state-by-state basis.
Clearly there are gains to tractability through these assumptions. But, the model does imply that
unemployed and employed workers have the same levels of expected utility. If state-contingent severance
pay was not feasible, the bargaining power of workers could create a gap in utility between employed and
unemployed workers. This is a common property of search models.
As discussed in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006), both the bargaining weight and the utility of unemployed
relative to employed workers impact the cyclical properties of the model. This is partially accommodated in
the model by allowing b(a).
37Understanding the quantitative implications of relaxing the assumptions made on the bargaining process
would be a useful extension of this framework. Among other things, this would imply that the cross-sectional
distribution of productivity would be part of the state vector and thus another source for richer dynamics.
8.4 Quits
The facts about inaction in employment adjustment and vacancies are revealing about adjustment costs,
quits and the process of hiring. If posting vacancies is the only way to hire workers, as in our model, then
inaction on vacancies must imply zero new hires. If this is coupled with zero quits, then zero net employment
growth arises. But, if there are quits, then the frequency of zero net employment adjustment will be less
than the frequency of zero vacancy posting.
The model we study allows for quits that are deterministic at the establishment level. In fact, we have
imposed a constant quit rate at each establishment since the model does not have a rich theory of quits given
the result that V e = V u.
In reality, quits are stochastic and endogenous. For small establishments, the randomness in quits is
not nulliﬁed by the law of large numbers. Thus, on a monthly basis, the quit rate ought to be modeled as
stochastic rather than deterministic.
As discussed in Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006a), quits are not independent of the employment
growth at the establishment level. When employment growth is negative, the quit rate is apparently higher.
Extending the model to include stochastic and endogenous quits may be important for matching obser-
vations on the frequency of zero net employment growth, about 30% of observations, and the frequency of
zero vacancies, about 45% of observations. With deterministic quits and non-convex adjustment costs, it
is not possible to explain inaction in both vacancies and net employment growth. Still, it is not clear how
much impact a richer model of quits would have on the aggregate implications of the model.
9 Conclusions
The goal of this paper has been to study the implications of a search model for observed movements in
• unemployment and vacancies at the aggregate level,
• employment and hours variations at the establishment level,
• the distribution of net employment growth at the establishment level.
While each of these aspects of the data have been explored independently in other studies, it is valuable
to look jointly at these observations. The micro evidence guides and disciplines the models built to match
aggregate observations, and the models based on the establishment level ought to be challenged to match
aggregates.
38Our framework is an extension of the standard search model with two features. First, in order to match
establishment level observations, we introduce non-convexities into the process of posting vacancies along
with convex adjustment costs. Second, we introduce hours variations into the search model through an
ex ante labor contracting structure. Both of these features require us to create a nontrivial model of the
producer. Finally, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), establishment speciﬁc shocks play a prominent
role in the analysis and in the moments generated by the model.
The returns on these novel modeling features accrue from insights into the costs of vacancies and ﬁring
and the ability of the model to resolve some of the puzzling aspects of the data. In that regard, we ﬁnd the
following:
• ﬁxed and linear adjustment costs are necessary to match observations,
• the model with hiring cost and the one with ﬁring costs do equally as well matching key moments,
• the model is able to match observed co-movements in hours and employment growth at the establish-
ment level,
• the model does not suﬀer from the ampliﬁcation problem highlighted in Shimer (2005), even with a
high elasticity of wages to productivity,
• the model does match some of the inaction and bursts reported for vacancies and employment adjust-
ment at the establishment level.
The paper concludes with a list of extensions to consider. These are intended to further shrink the gap
between the model and facts about labor markets.
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